[selected readings for HIS 3995-02, Fall 2002, meeting of Wed., Nov. 20]
15 &
16 May, 1916:
The
Sykes-Picot Agreement [BRITISH-FRENCH
AGREEMENT FOR POSTWAR PARTITION OF OTTOMAN TURKISH-CONTROLLED ARAB TERRITORIES]
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1916/sykespicot.html 11/17/2002
1. Sir
Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15 May 1916
I shall
have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency's note of
the 9th instant, relative to
the
creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your
Excellency could assure me that in
those
regions which, under the conditions recorded in that communication, become
entirely French, or in
which
French interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British
concessions, rights of navigation
or
development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious,
scholastic, or medical institutions will be
maintained.
His
Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in
regard to the British area.
2. Sir
Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 16 May 1916
I have
the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th
instant, stating that the
French
Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of
States, and of those parts of
Syria
where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached
thereto, such as they
result
from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.
I have
the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole
project, as it now
stands,
will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His
Majesty's Government
recognise
the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more
favourable internal
political
situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at,
provided that the
co-operation
of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain
the towns of Homs,
Hama,
Damascus, and Aleppo.
It is
accordingly understood between the French and British Governments---
1. That
France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent
Arab State or a
Confederation
of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the
suzerainty of
an Arab
chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have
priority of right of enterprise
and local
loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone
supply advisers or foreign
functionaries
at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
2. That
in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to
establish such direct or
indirect
administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange
with the Arab State or
Confederation
of Arab States. 3. That in the brown area there shall be established an
international
administration,
the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and
subsequently in
consultation
with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.
4. That
Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a
given supply of water
from the
Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's Government, on
their part, undertake
that they
will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third
Power without the
previous
consent of the French Government.
5. That
Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire,
and that there shall be no
discrimination
in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods;
that there shall be
freedom
of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the
blue area, whether those
goods are
intended for or originate in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there
shall be no
discrimination,
direct or indirect against British goods on any railway or against British
goods or ships at any
port
serving the areas mentioned.
That
Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and
protectorates, and there
shall be
no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and
French goods. There
shall be
freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway
through the brown area,
whether
those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area
(B), and there shall be
no discrimination,
direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French
goods or ships at
any port
serving the areas mentioned.
6. That
in area (A) the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul,
and in area (B)
northwards
beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo via the
Euphrates Valley has
been
completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.
7. That
Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway
connecting Haifa with
area (B),
and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all
times.
It is to
be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the
connexion of Baghdad with
Haifa by
rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and
expense entailed by keeping
this
connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the
French Government shall be
prepared
to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis
Marib-Salkhab Tell
Otsda-Mesmie
before reaching area (B).
8. For a
period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in
force throughout the whole
of the
blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the
rates of duty or conversion
from ad
valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two
Powers.
There
shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas.
The customs duties
leviable
on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and
handed over to the
administration
of the area of destination.
9. It
shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any
negotiations for the cession of
their
rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power,
except the Arab State or
Confederation
of Arab States without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who,
on their
part,
will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red
area.
10. The
British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall
agree that they will not
themselves
acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions
in the Arabian
peninsula,
nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast,
or on the islands, of
the Red
Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as
may be necessary in
consequence
of recent Turkish aggression.
11. The
negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or
Confederation of Arab States
shall be
continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.
12. It is
agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab
territories will be considered by
the two
Governments.
I have
further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His
Majesty's Government
are
proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those
exchanged by the latter
and your
Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be
communicated to your
Excellency
as soon as exchanged.
I would
also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present
agreement raises, for
practical
consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition
or rearrangement of
Turkey in
Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915,
between Italy and the
Allies.
His
Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be
informed of the
arrangement
now concluded.
From: Country Study
& Country Guide for Syria
[http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/syria/syria15.html 11/17/2002]
WORLD WAR I AND
ARAB NATIONALISM [The case of SYRIA]
The period from
the outbreak of World War I in 1914 to the granting of France's mandate over
Syria by the
League of Nations in 1922 was marked by a complicated sequence of events and
power politics
during which Syrians achieved a brief moment of independence. Syrian
intellectuals,
many of them graduates of European and European- or American-run universities,
were urging the
study of Arab history, literature, and language. Also, groups of Syrians
publicly
demanded
decentralization of Ottoman administration and administrative reform. As
Ottoman
governors such as
Jamal Pasha suppressed them, Syrians went underground and demanded
complete Arab
independence. One of the first secret groups to form was Al Jamiyyah al
Arabiyah al Fatat
(the Young Arab Society, known as Al Fatat, not to be confused with the
contemporary Al
Fatah, or Fatah, of the Palestine Liberation Organization--PLO), of which
Prince Faysal, son
of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, was a member. Another group was Al Ahd (the
Covenant), a
secret association of Arab army officers.
Following the
outbreak of World War I, Jamal Pasha determined to tighten his control over
Syria. Attacking
dissidents ruthlessly, he arrested Al Fatat members. Twenty-one Arabs were
hanged in the city
squares of Damascus and Beirut on the morning of May 6, 1915. The event
is commemorated as
Martyrs' Day, a national holiday in Syria and Lebanon.
Events leading to
Syria's momentary independence began in the Arabian Peninsula. The
British--anxious
for Arab support against the Ottomans in the war and desiring to strengthen
their position
vis-a-vis the French in the determination of the Middle East's future--asked
Sharif Husayn, leader of the Hashimite
family and an Ottoman appointee over the Hijaz, to lead
the Arabs in
revolt. In return the British gave certain assurances, which Husayn interpreted
as
an endorsement of his eventual kingship of the Arab
world. From the Arab nationalists in
Damascus came
pleas for the Hashimites to assume leadership. Husayn accepted, and on June
5, 1916, the
Hijazi tribesmen, led by Husayn's sons and later advised by such British
officers as
T.E. Lawrence,
rose against the Turks. In October 1918, Faysal entered Damascus as a popular
hero.
Faysal, as military governor, assumed
immediate control of all Syria except for the areas along
the Mediterranean
coast where French troops were garrisoned. In July 1919, he convened the
General Syrian Congress, which declared Syria sovereign
and free. In March 1920, the congress
proclaimed Faysal
king of Syria.
Faysal and his
Syrian supporters began reconstructing Syria. They declared Arabic the official
language and
proceeded to have school texts translated from Turkish. They reopened schools
and started new
ones, including the Faculty of Law at the Syrian University and the Arab
Academy in
Damascus. Also, Faysal appointed a committee to begin drawing up a
constitution.
In the areas still
held by the French, Syrians continued to revolt. In the Jabal an Nusayriyah
around Latakia in
the northwest, there was an uprising against French troops in May 1919.
Along the Turkish
border, the nationalist leader Ibrahim Hannanu incited another rebellion in
July
1919. The French defeated these attempts but not
before Hannanu and Faysal had acquired
permanent places
in Syrian history as heroes.
Three forces
worked against Arab nationalism and Faysal's budding Arab monarchy. One was
Britain's earlier
interest in keeping eastern Mesopotamia under control, both to counter Russian
influence in the
north and to protect oil interests in the area. The second was Zionism and the
Jewish interest in
Palestine. Although Britain had promised to recognize "an independent Arab
State or a
Confederation of Arab States" in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16,
1916, (not
published until
later-see below), in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 it had also promised
Zionists
a "national
home" in Palestine. The two promises were in direct conflict. The third
force was
France's
determination to remain a power in the Middle East. Earlier in the war, the
French,
British, Italians,
and Russians had met secretly to decide the fate of Arab lands. After the
Russian
Revolution, the Bolsheviks published secret diplomatic documents, among them
the
Sykes-Picot
Agreement. In this agreement, signed only six months after the British had
vaguely
promised Husayn an
Arab kingdom, Britain and France agreed to give the French paramount
influence in what
became Syria and Lebanon; the British were to have predominance in what
became Transjordan
and Iraq.
At the Versailles
Peace Conference in 1919, Woodrow Wilson asked that the Arab claims to
independence be
given consideration, and Faysal was invited to present the Arab cause. His
pleas were
unavailing, as was a report recommending Syrian independence under Faysal or a
United States
mandate over the country. Disappointed by his failure at Versailles, Faysal
returned to
Damascus and declared again that Syria was nevertheless free and independent.
France and Britain
refused to recognize Syria's independence, and the Supreme Allied Council,
meeting in San
Remo, Italy, in April 1920, partitioned the Arab world into mandates as
prearranged by the
earlier Sykes-Picot Agreement. Syria became a French mandate, and
French soldiers
began marching from Beirut to Damascus. Arab resistance was crushed, and on
July 25, 1920, the
French took Damascus. Faysal fled to Europe and did not return to the
Middle East until the British made him king of Iraq in
1921. Faysal's brother Abdullah was
recognized by the
British as the amir of the region that became known as Transjordan. The
boundaries of
these states were thus drawn unilaterally by the European allies after World
War
I. Syria had
experienced its brief moment of independence (1919-20), the loss of which
Syrians
blamed on France
and Britain. These events left a lasting bitterness against the West and a
deep-seated
determination to reunite Arabs into one state. This was the primary basis for
modern Arab
nationalism and the central ideological concept of future pan-Arab parties,
such
as the Baath (Arab
Socialist Resurrection) Party and the Arab National Movement. Aspects of
the ideology also were
evolved in the 1950s and 1960s by Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt.
THE FRENCH
MANDATE IN SYRIA
French-British
rivalry in the Middle East continued after the two countries had divided the
area
into spheres of influence at San Remo. In
their mandate, the French sought to increase their
strength by
supporting and separating religious minorities and thereby weakening the
Ara b
nationalist movement. France originally planned to
establish three sectarian states: an Alawi
state in the
north, a Sunni Muslim state at the center, and a Druze state in the south. The
three were
eventually to be incorporated into a federal Syria. France did create a
Christian
state in the area
of Mount Lebanon. The Sunni Muslim state never materialized. Instead, in
1926 the French,
working with Maronite leaders, expanded the original boundaries of the
Christian state to
create Lebanon. To the east the valley of the Biqa, predominantly populated
by Muslims, was
added; to the west the Christian state was expanded to the coast and
incorporated the
cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre.
The rest of Syria
was divided into five semiautonomous areas- -the Jabal Druze, Aleppo,
Latakia, Damascus, and Alexandretta
(modern Iskenderun)--which accentuated religious
differences and
cultivated regional, as opposed to national pan-Arab, sentiment (see Religious
Life , ch. 2). The Druzes were given
administration of the Jabal Druze, the area of their
greatest
concentration. The northern coastal region and the Jabal an Nusayriyah (where
there
was a concentration
of Alawis, Syria's largest religious minority) were united in the state of
Latakia
(present-day Al Ladhiqiyah Province). North of Latakia, the district of
Alexandretta (the
present-day Turkish
province of Hatay), home of some Turks, had a separate government. In
the area to the
south, in Palestine, European Jews were promised a Jewish homeland.
Opposition by
nationalistic Arabs to the many divisions proved fruitless, and Arab
nationalists
became isolated in
Damascus.
French rule was
oppressive. The franc became the base of the economy, and currency
management was in
the hands of French bankers concerned with French, rather than Syrian,
shareholders and
interests. The French language became compulsory in schools, and pupils
were required to
sing the "Marseillaise." Colonial administrators attempted to apply
techniques
of administration
learned in North Africa to the more sophisticated Arabs of Syria. Nearly every
feature of Syrian
life came under French control.
The Syrians were
an embittered, disillusioned people whose leaders kept them in ferment.
Shaykh Salih ibn
Ali led the Alawis in intermittent revolt, Shaykh Ismail Harir rebelled in the
Hawran, and in the
Jabal Druze, Sultan Pasha al Atrash, kinsman of the paramount chief of the
Druzes, led
continual resistance, most notably in 1925, as did Mulhim Qasim in the
mountains
around Baalbek. The revolts, however, were
not necessarily expressions of desire for unified
Syrian
independence. They were uprisings by individual groups--Alawis, Druzes, and
beduins--against
foreign interference, comparable to those earlier fomented against the
Ottomans.
In Damascus Arab
nationalism was led by educated, wealthy Muslims who had earlier supported
Faysal. Their grievances against the French were
many, but chief among them were French
suppression of
newspapers, political activity, and civil rights and the division of Greater
Syria
into several political units. They also
objected to French reluctance to frame a constitution for
Syria that would
provide for the eventual sovereignty that the League of Nations mandate had
ordered. When the
Iraqis gained an elected assembly from the British in March 1924, Syrian
Arabs became even
more distressed. On February 9, 1925, as a placating move, the French
permitted the
nationalists to form the People's Party. Led by Faris al Khuri, they demanded
French recognition
of eventual Syrian independence, unity of the country, more stress on
education, and the
granting of civil liberties.
The most immediate
issue was Syrian unity, since France had divided the country into six
parts. In 1925 the
Aleppo and Damascus provinces were joined, and in 1926 Lebanon became
an independent republic under French control. The
League of Nations in its session in Rome in
February to March
1926 stated: "The Commission thinks it beyond doubt that these
oscillations
in matters so
calculated to encourage the controversies inspired by the rivalries of races,
clans
and religions,
which are so keen in this country, to arouse all kinds of ambitions and to
jeopardize serious
moral and material interests, have maintained a condition of instability and
unrest in the
mandated territory."
Devastating proof
of the miscalculations of the French burst into the open with the 1925 Druze
revolt. The Druzes
had many complaints, but chief among them was the foreign intervention in
Druze affairs. The
Ottomans had never successfully subdued these mountain people; although
split among
themselves, they were united in their opposition to foreign rule. Led by Sultan
Pasha al Atrash,
Druzes attacked and captured Salkhad on July 20, 1925, and on August 2 they
took the Druze capital, As Suwayda.
News of the Druze
rebellion spread throughout Syria and ignited revolts in Aleppo and
Damascus among
Syrian nationalists, who pleaded with Atrash to attack the Syrian capital. In
October the Druzes
invaded the Damascus region; nationalist leaders led their own
demonstrations;
and the French began systematic bombardment of the city, resulting in the
death of 5,000
Syrians. The rebellion collapsed by the end of the year, and reluctant order
replaced open
revolt.
The return of
order gave the French military government an opportunity to assist Syrians in
self-government,
an obligation demanded of France by the League of Nations. In 1928 the
French allowed the
formation of the National Bloc (Al Kutlah al Wataniyah), composed of
various
nationalist groups centered in Damascus. The nationalist alliance was headed by
Ibrahim Hannanu
and Hashim al Atassi and included leading members of large landowning
families. One of the most extreme groups in the
National Bloc was the Istiqlal (Independence)
Party, a
descendant of the old Al Fatat secret society of which Shukri al Quwatly was a
leading
member. Elections of that year for a
constituent assembly put the National Bloc in power, and
Hannanu set out to
write a constitution. It provided for the reunification of Syria and ignored
the authority of
the French. In 1930 the French imposed the constitution minus articles that
would have given
Syria unified self-government.
Syrian
nationalists continued to assert that they at least should have a treaty with
France
setting forth
French aims, since Britain and Iraq had signed such a treaty in 1922. Unrest
after
the death of the
nationalist leader Hannanu at the end of 1935, followed by a general strike in
1936, brought new
negotiations for such a treaty. Under Leon Blum's liberal-socialist
government in
France, the two countries worked out the Syrian-French Treaty of Alliance in
1936. The French
parliament never ratified the treaty, yet a feeling of optimism prevailed in
Syria as the first
nationalist government came to power with Hashim al Atassi as president.
During 1937 Syria's drive for independence seemed
to be advancing under National Bloc
leadership. France
allowed the return of Jabal Druze and Latakia to the Syrian state and turned
over many local
government functions to the Syrian government. French administration during
the previous years
had given some advantages to the Syrians. It had built modern cities in
Damascus and Aleppo
and roads and schools throughout much of the country; and it had
partially trained
some Syrians as minor bureaucrats. French cultural influence spread in the
schools, in the
press, and even in the style of dress; social and economic conditions slowly
improved.
Under the French,
Syria became a refuge for persecuted groups from neighboring countries.
Most of the Kurdish
population arrived between 1924 and 1938, fleeing Kemalist rule in Turkey.
The major
immigration of Armenians occurred between 1925 and 1945 as a result of similar
persecution.
Assyrians, under attack in Iraq in 1933, settled in eastern Syria (see Kurds;
Armenians; Others
, ch. 2).
Although the
country appeared to be on the verge of peace, true calm evaded Syria. Claims by
Turkey to Alexandretta, Arab revolts in Palestine, an
economic crisis caused by depreciation of
the French franc,
and lack of unity among Syrians served to undermine the stability of the
Syrian government.
The National Bloc was split by rivalries. Abdul Rahman Shahabandar, a
leading
nationalist, formed a rival organization in 1939 to compete for Syrian
political leadership,
but he was assassinated
a year later. Separatist movements in the Jabal Druze found French
support and
antagonized the nationalists.
During the course
of the Syrian-French treaty discussions in 1936, Turkey had asked for
reconsideration of
the situation in Hatay--at that time the Syrian province of
Alexandretta--which had a large Turkish minority and already had been
given a special
administrative system under the
Franco-Turkish Agreement of Ankara (sometimes called the
Franklin-Bouillon
Agreement) in 1921. The case was submitted to the League of Nations, which
in 1937 decided that
Alexandretta should be a separate, self- governing political state. Direct
negotiations
between Turkey and France ended on July 13, 1939, with France agreeing to
absorption of
Alexandretta by Turkey. Disturbances broke out in Syria against France and the
Syrian government,
which Syrian nationalist leaders felt had not adequately defended their
interests. Syrian
President Atassi resigned, parliamentary institutions were abolished, and
France governed an
unruly Syria through the Council of Directors. Latakia and the Jabal Druze
were again set up
as separate units. The French government officially declared it would not
submit the
Syrian-French treaty to the French Chamber of Deputies for ratification.
Data as of April
1987
----------------------------------
IRAQ [then referred to generally as
"Mesopotamia"]
http://www.cc.ukans.edu/~kansite/ww_one/docs/kncr.htm 11/17/2002
Report of
[the] American section of Inter-allied Commission of mandates in Turkey. An
official
United States
government report by the Inter-allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey.
American
Section [excerpt]
II-THE
REPORT UPON MESOPOTAMIA
In view
of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on January 30, 1919, and of
the Anglo-French
Declaration
of November 9, 1918-on the eve of the Armistice-both of which documents class
Syria and
Mesopotamia
together to be treated in the same way, and make to them the same promises and
assurances,
the
Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference, adopt for Mesopotamia a
policy in general
parallel
to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-French Declaration may
not become another
"scrap
of paper."
1. We
accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our
instructions, that
whatever
foreign administration is brought into Mesopotamia should come into Mesopotamia
not at ail as a
colonizing
power in the old sense of that term, but as a mandatary under the League of
Nations, with clear
consciousness
that "the well-being and development" of the Mesopotamian people form
for it a sacred trust.
To this
end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be
determined by the League of
Nations,
in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, whether in the
annual reports of the
Mandatary
to the League or in other ways.
The
entire text of the first recommendation for Syria, with its subordinate
recommendations, applies point by
point to
Mesopotamia as truly as to Syria.
If the Peace
Conference. the League of Nations, and the appointed Mandatary Power loyally
carry out the
policy of
mandataries embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the most
essential interests of
Mesopotamia
would be fully safeguarded-but only so.
2. We
recommend, in the second place that the unity of Mesopotamia be preserved: the
precise boundaries
to be
determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the mandate. has been
assigned. It should
probably
include at least the Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern
Kurds and Assyrians
might
well be linked up with Mesopotamia. The wisdom of a united country needs no
argument in the case of
Mesopotamia.
3. We
recommend, in the third place, that Mesopotamia be placed under one Mandatary
Power, as the
natural
way to secure real and efficient unity. The economic, political, social and
educational development of
the
people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste confusion, friction, and
injury to the people's
interests
could come from attempting a division and "spheres of influence" on
the part of several nations. But
this
implies that the Mandatary Power shall not itself be an exploiting power, but
shall sacredly guard the
people's
rights.
4. Since
it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony in the political and
economic institutions and
arrangements
of Mesopotamia and Syria, and since the people themselves should have chief
voice in
determining
the form of government under which they shall live we recommend that the
Government of
Mesopotamia,
in harmony with the apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional
Monarchy, such as is
proposed
for Syria; and that the people of Mesopotamia be given opportunity to indicate
their choice of
Monarch,
the choice to be reviewed and confirmed by the League of Nations. It may be
fairly assumed that
the 1,278
petitions from Syrians for the independence of Mesopotamia-68.5 per cent of the
total number
received-reflects
the feeling in Mesopotamia itself; and such contact as we have been able to
secure with
Mesopotamians
confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the program, presented at
Aleppo by
representative
Mesopotamians, headed by Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor of the Aleppo
District, and
practically
parallel to the Damascus Program, would be generally supported by the
Mesopotamian people.
Whether
this support extends to each item in the program alike, and so to the naming of
a King from the sons
of the
King of the Hedjaz, we have not sufficient data to determine, and so have
recommended that a
plebiscite
be taken upon that point; although there is British evidence that many
Mesopotamians have
expressed
themselves in favor of one of the sons of the King of the Hedjaz as Emir.
5. The
Mesopotamian Program expresses its choice of America as Mandatary, and with no
second choice.
Undoubtedly
there has been a good deal of feeling in Mesopotamia against Great Britain, and
the petitions
specifically
charge the British authorities in Mesopotamia with considerable interference
with freedom of
opinion,
of expression, and of travel,-much of which might be justified in time of
military occupation. But
feeling
so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express desire for Great
Britain as Mandatary.
On the other
hand, the material in the pamphlet called "Copies and Translations of
Declarations and other
Documents
relating to Self-Determination in Iraq" (Mesopotamia) was called out by an
attempt on the part of
the
British Government in Mesopotamia to secure the opinions of leading men of all
groups concerning
"self-determination."
This material just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtless
somewhat
more
favorable to the British than it would otherwise be; but it gives
unquestionably good evidence of much
opinion
likely to choose a British mandate. And after all the range of choice of a
mandatary, of sufficient
power and
experience and of essential justice, is decidedly limited, and it is by no
means improbable that if
the
Mesopotamians were confronted by a refusal of America to take a mandate for
Mesopotamia, they would
make
Great Britain at least second choice, as the majority of the Syrians did. There
is supplementary
evidence
also upon this point.
Now it
seems so unlikely that America could or would take a mandate for Mesopotamia,
in addition to the
possible
consideration of Syria and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that
the Peace
Conference
assign the mandate for Mesopotamia to Great Britain: because of the general
reasons already
given for
recommending her as mandatary in Syria if America does not go in there, because
she is probably
best of
all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long relations with
the Arabs; in recognition of
the sacrifices
made by her in delivering Mesopotamia from the Turks, though with no
acknowledgment of right
of
conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because of the special
interests she naturally has in
Mesopotamia
on account of its nearness to India and its close connections with Arabia; and
because of work
already
done in the territory.
These
reasons make it probable that the largest interests of the people of
Mesopotamia as a whole will be
best
served by a British Mandate, in spite of the fact that from the point of view
of world-interests, in the
prevention
of jealousy, suspicion, and fear of domination by a single Power, it were
better for both Britain and
the world
that no further territory anywhere be added to the British Empire. A British
mandate however, will
have the
decided advantage of tending to promote economic and educational unity
throughout Mesopotamia
and Syria
whether Syria be under Great Britain or America-and so will reflect more fully
than ever before, the
close
relations in language, customs, and trade between these parts of the former
Turkish Empire.
In a
country so rich as Mesopotamia in agricultural possibilities, in oil, and in
other resources, with the best
intentions
there will inevitably be danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the
Mandatary Power,
through
making British interests supreme, and especially through large Indian
immigration. This danger will
need
increasingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Mesopotamians feel
very strongly the
menace
particularly of Indian immigration, even though that immigration should be
confined to Moslems. They
dread the
admixture of another people of entirely different race and customs, as
threatening their Arabic
civilization.
Respectfully submitted,
HENRY C
KING,
CHARLES R.
CRANE
[FOLLOWING
FROM:
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/mesopo.html 11/17/2002]
Ex.-Lieut.-Col. T.E. Lawrence,
The
Sunday Times [London], 22 August 1920
[Mr.
Lawrence, whose organization and direction of the Hedjaz against the Turks was
one of the outstanding
romances
of the war, has written this article at our request in order that the public
may be fully informed of
our
Mesopotamian commitments.]
The
people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will
be hard to escape with
dignity
and honour. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of
information. The Baghdad
communiques
are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have been far worse than we have
been told, our
administration
more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our
imperial record, and
may soon
be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are to-day not far from a disaster.
The sins
of commission are those of the British civil authorities in Mesopotamia
(especially of three 'colonels')
who were
given a free hand by London. They are controlled from no Department of State,
but from the empty
space
which divides the Foreign Office from the India Office. They availed themselves
of the necessary
discretion
of war-time to carry over their dangerous independence into times of peace.
They contest every
suggestion
of real self- government sent them from home. A recent proclamation about
autonomy circulated
with
unction from Baghdad was drafted and published out there in a hurry, to
forestall a more liberal
statement
in preparation in London, 'Self-determination papers' favourable to England
were extorted in
Mesopotamia
in 1919 by official pressure, by aeroplane demonstrations, by deportations to
India.
The
Cabinet cannot disclaim all responsibility. They receive little more news than
the public: they should have
insisted
on more, and better. they have sent draft after draft of reinforcements,
without enquiry. When
conditions
became too bad to endure longer, they decided to send out as High commissioner
the original
author of
the present system, with a conciliatory message to the Arabs that his heart and
policy have
completely
changed.*
Yet our
published policy has not changed, and does not need changing. It is that there
has been a
deplorable
contrast between our profession and our practice. We said we went to
Mesopotamia to defeat
Turkey.
We said we stayed to deliver the Arabs from the oppression of the Turkish
Government, and to make
available
for the world its resources of corn and oil. We spent nearly a million men and
nearly a thousand
million
of money to these ends. This year we are spending ninety-two thousand men and
fifty millions of
money on
the same objects.
Our
government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept fourteen thousand
local conscripts
embodied,
and killed a yearly average of two hundred Arabs in maintaining peace. We keep
ninety thousand
men, with
aeroplanes, armoured cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about
ten thousand
Arabs in
this rising this summer. We cannot hope to maintain such an average: it is a
poor country, sparsely
peopled;
but Abd el Hamid would applaud his masters, if he saw us working. We are told
the object of the
rising
was political, we are not told what the local people want. It may be what the
Cabinet has promised them.
A
Minister in the House of Lords said that we must have so many troops because
the local people will not
enlist.
On Friday the Government announce the death of some local levies defending
their British officers,
and say
that the services of these men have not yet been sufficiently recognized
because they are too few
(adding
the characteristic Baghdad touch that they are men of bad character). There are
seven thousand of
them,
just half the old Turkish force of occupation. Properly officered and distributed,
they would relieve half
our army
there. Cromer controlled Egypt's six million people with five thousand British
troops; Colonel Wilson
fails to
control Mesopotamia's three million people with ninety thousand troops.
We have
not reached the limit of our military commitments. Four weeks ago the staff in
Mesopotamia drew up
a
memorandum asking for four more divisions. I believe it was forwarded to the
War Office, which has now
sent
three brigades from India. If the North-West Frontier cannot be further
denuded, where is the balance to
come
from? Meanwhile, our unfortunate troops, Indian and British, under hard
conditions of climate and
supply,
are policing an immense area, paying dearly every day in lives for the wilfully
wrong policy of the civil
administration
in Baghdad. General Dyer was relieved of his command in India for a much
smaller error, but
the
responsibility in this case is not on the Army, which has acted only at the
request of the civil authorities.
The War
Office has made every effort to reduce our forces, but the decisions of the
Cabinet have been
against
them.
The
Government in Baghdad have been hanging Arabs in that town for political
offences, which they call
rebellion.
The Arabs are not at war with us. Are these illegal executions to provoke the
Arabs to reprisals on
the three
hundred British prisoners they hold? And, if so, is it that their punishment
may be more severe, or is
it to
persuade our other troops to fight to the last?
We say we
are in Mesopotamia to develop it for the benefit of the world. all experts say
that the labour supply
is the
ruling factor in its development. How far will the killing of ten thousand
villagers and townspeople this
summer
hinder the production of wheat, cotton, and oil? How long will we permit
millions of pounds, thousands
of
Imperial troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of
colonial administration which
can
benefit nobody but its administrators?
*Sir
Percy Cox was to return as High Commissioner in October, 1920 to form a
provisional Government.
-----------------------------
Author B J Slot
No. of pages 187
Published 1991 Second Edition
1998
Language English and French
Professor Slot’s work is designed to unfold
Kuwait’s existence. His collection of
documents covers more than 200 years starting
from 1615, which illustrates the
history, the great events and cycle of
Kuwait’s development. The author
examined historic European maps and nautical
charts of the Arabian Gulf in order
to discover an evolution in the way in which
the area of Kuwait has been depicted.
The results of a comparative study of the
European (Portuguese, Dutch, French,
Danish, German, and English) cartography of
the Gulf area since the first features
of Kuwaiti territory were noted in 1563 are
recorded in this book. This material
sheds more light on the obscure period in the
history of Kuwait before 1800. Dr
Slot concentrates on the collection kept by
the General State Archives of the
Netherlands. as well as pages from reports,
texts and letters written by Arab and
European voyagers and historians. The book
also contains a series of
photographs covering all significant
cartographic currents relevant to the area of
Kuwait up to 1820 with some later samples up
to the 1860s. Slot discusses the
first markings on maps of Kuwait territory in
the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the beginning of Dutch
cartography, late offshoots of the Portuguese
cartographic traditions, visits to Kuwait
territory, the first mention of the Utub
tribes and how the European sources mention
the name of Kuwait.
It was clear to European cartographers that
Kazima (early Kuwait) was outside the
borders of Ottoman Iraq. The contemporary
documents included in the book,
supply evidence on the early history of the
Utub tribe and the independent
territorial entity they established in Kuwait
and how traders could find a safe
harbour in Kuwait with good connections to
the Mediterranean, outside the
influence of the badly-functioning Ottoman
Government of Basra.
webmaster@crsk.org
Copyright © 2002 Center for
Research and Studies on Kuwait
P O Box 65131, AL Mansouriya, 35652, Kuwait
Tel (965) 2574081/2/3 -
Fax (965) 2574078
A
British View of the Origins of Kuwait:
The State of Kuwait was
originally referred to as 'Qurain' in the early seventeenth
century, although the
earliest evidence of human presence is the existence of Mesolithic
tools dating back to 8000
BC.
The ruling family had its
origins of governance around 250 years ago under the 1st Al
Sabah. However during the
late 1890s, growing Turk ambitions, prompted the rulers to
sign a Treaty with Britain
in 1899 which defined Kuwait as "an independent Country
under British
Protection". The discovery and exploitation of oil was somewhat delayed by
the 2nd World War and the
first exports did not start until 1946. In the 1950's & 1960's
Kuwait underwent its
transition from a small emirate to an internationally influential
modern state.
The Oil
Sector
Oil was discovered in 1938,
in the Burgan Oilfield in the southern part of the country.
This oilfield which now has
over 300 wells, has proved to be one of the world's richest,
contains about half of
Kuwait's proven recoverable reserves. Commercial production of
crude oil began in 1946 and
peaked at 3.3 million barrels a day in 1972. At the time of the
Iraqi invasion in August
1990, this output had evened out to 2 million bpd, against an
installed capacity of 2.5
million bpd.
[http://www.ponl.com/topic/home_page/language_en/products_and_services/country_information/country_map/middle_east/kuwait/country_details 11/18/2002]
[Another
anti-Iraqi view:]
From
www.danielpipes.org |
Original
article available at: www.danielpipes.org/article/775
by
Frederick F. Anscombe
New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997. 270 pp. $47.50 (paper, $17.50)
Middle
East Quarterly
Summer
1998
Reviewed
by Daniel Pipes
The
nineteenth-century Persian Gulf has been much studied but, Anscombe stresses,
always
relying primarily on the British archives and therefore seen predominantly from
the
British
point of view. He instead bases his work on the Ottoman documents and sees the
Gulf from
the perspective of Istanbul. Perhaps his most dramatic insight concerns the
ineptitude
of the Ottomans and their inability to provide the sort of decent
administration
that
would keep the allegiance of the Gulf Arabs. Oddly, the British challenge in
the region
stimulated
the Ottomans to govern even worse than before because, driven by what the
author
calls "overblown suspicion," the Turks "often diverted scarce
resources to meet
unlikely
outside threats" instead of fixing problems. This created opportunities
that London
took
advantage of so regularly that by 1913 - on the eve of World War I-it had won
paramount
authority in the region and Ottoman rule had come to an end.
The most
immediately relevant conclusion of Anscombe's excellent though dense study
concerns
the historical origins of Kuwait, about which he is quite definite: "the
Iraqi claim
to
historical rights over Kuwait is very week." While Kuwait did indeed come
under
Ottoman
rule, it "was neither integrated into, nor dependent upon, Iraq."
Indeed, its links
to Iraq
did not exceed those to other regions, such as the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and
India.
From
www.danielpipes.org |
Original
article available at: www.danielpipes.org/article/775
[editor's note: although the following piece uses language such as "we" and "our"
to refer to Iraqi claims, it is NOT an "official" Iraq government publication,
but rather produced by a group that calls itself the "Expansionist Party of
the United States." Hence it cannot in fact claim to represent the actual
motivations for the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991; however, it is
worth reading as a critique of British imperial policies in the Persian Gulf]
[http://hometown.aol.com/XPUS/Iraq.html 11/18/2002]
[Excerpt;
I have omitted the preceding long history of Mesopotamia]
Backward
Europe Moves to the Fore. As the Ottoman state declined and
became
"the sick man of Europe", West European empires rose. (Though in
later
years the Ottoman Empire was mostly in Asia, its capital was in Europe,
and it is
the ambitions of rival European empires that led to its downfall. It
allowed
itself to be drawn into World War I on the side of the Central Powers
(Germany
and Austria-Hungary) — who turned out to be the losers.) The
greatest
of the West European empires, the British, took special interest in
Mesopotamia.
Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain made
Mesopotamia
into virtually a British sphere of influence halfway between its
African
and Indian colonies. Which is how all the trouble we are now
experiencing
in the Middle East began.
The
History of Kuwait.
We have just summarized, in some 4,000 words,
Iraq's
enormously long and complicated history — thru virtually all of which
Kuwait
has been part of Iraq or its predecessor states. Now we can dispense
in three
paragraphs with Kuwait's history apart from Iraq:
"Kuwait had few settled inhabitants
before 1700 [A.D.]. About 1710,
some members of the Arab Anaza tribal
confederation settled on the
southern shore of Kuwait Bay, where they
found fresh water. These
people probably fled from their homeland
in Arabia to escape a
drought. They built a port that later
became the city of Kuwait. Between
1756 and 1762, the group elected the head
of the Al-Sabah family to
rule them as Sabah I.
"In 1775, the British made Kuwait the
starting point of their desert mail
service to Aleppo, Syria. This route
formed part of a system that
carried goods and messages from India to
England. Over the years,
British interest in Kuwait grew. In 1899,
Great Britain became
responsible for Kuwait's defense."
(World Book Encyclopedia)
In 1961
Britain gave Kuwait independence, whereupon Iraq immediately
asserted
its rightful claim to restoration of Kuwait to Iraq. Though one
government
decided not to pursue that claim, President Hussein had to
reassert
it because Kuwait was a thorn in our [=Iraq's] side and we realized
that
leaving a border between us would produce perpetual conflict between
the house
of Al-Sabah and the people of Iraq.
There you
have it: the entire history of Kuwait.
The
"Protectorate". Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines
"protectorate"
as "the relationship of superior authority assumed by one power
or state
over a dependent one". People not familiar with the way things worked
in the
old world may not understand the World Book's polite description, above,
of
Kuwait's involvement with Britain. What happened is that the Ottoman
Empire
exercised only weak control over fringe areas of desert, because they
weren't
important. They had almost no people and little or no resources, and
required
little or no services from government. Local tribes of nomads were
pretty
much left to fend for themselves. Fiercely tribal, they rejected central
authority,
be it from Baghdad or Constantinople. They set up their own local
leaders,
sheikhs, and gave only lip service, if that, to the national government.
But every
now and then a strong leader in Constantinople would want to teach
these
upstart sheikhs a lesson and reassert central control. So the sheikh
would
approach a foreign power to protect him from the national government's
assertion
of its rights. In exchange for such "protection", the foreign power
demanded
certain privileges from the locals, like controlling their economy;
obtaining
military or naval bases on their territory; running their post office,
foreign
affairs, and so forth. From the modern point of view, then, what
happened
when Britain established a "protectorate" over Kuwait in 1899 is that
Britain
made Kuwait a colony. Kuwaitis exchanged one faraway, foreign
overlord
for another, one even farther away and more foreign.
Why did
Britain want Kuwait? You probably think of Britain as the little country
off the
coast of Europe that it is today. But in 1899 Britain controlled an
enormous
overseas empire, the largest in the history of the world, and needed
harbors
spaced strategically between colonies to protect British interests, both
from
internal revolt and from other empires. To appreciate how large the British
Empire
was, consider that at its height, it was about 12 million square miles in
area —
1/5 the entire land area of planet Earth; 3 1/3 times the size of the 50
United
States; half again as large as the Soviet Union — and contained a
fourth of
the entire world's population. It was no idle boast that "the sun never
sets on
the British Empire", because British colonies circled the globe. To hold
this
far-flung empire together, Britain needed ports for its immense navy. When
the
British Admiralty surveyed the maps of the Middle East, they saw in Kuwait
Bay a
magnificent harbor large enough to hold all the ships of the British Navy,
strategically
placed midway between British Africa and British India, and close
to a
crumbling Ottoman Empire that was certain to lose all its Arabian colonies
sooner or
later. Britain wanted to be there to pick up the pieces, especially
since it
was already apparent that large reserves of oil lay under the previously
worthless
sands of the Arabian Peninsula. (In 1931, before Kuwait's oil
reserves
were found, an atlas listed the products of Kuwait as "horses, wool,
pearls,
and dates". That was it, the entire list.)
Look at
the map of the Near East in 1914 and you will see that the Ottoman
Empire
was a bone in Britain's imperial throat, interfering with the sweep of
British
colonies from Egypt to India and holding the bulk of Arabia against
British
oil exploitation. Britain no more cared about the human rights of Kuwaitis
then,
than the international oil companies do now. The ruling class of the British
Empire
merely wanted to rip Arabia from the Ottomans to enlarge its dominions
and
wealth, and improve the geographical continuity and defendability of its
Empire.
So it provoked the Al-Sabah family into a complete break from the
Sultan in
Constantinople.
Kuwait Stolen.
Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman
Empire for 350 years. The
Turks administered it as part of
the province (vilayet) of
Basra, which in turn was one of
three vilayets into which
Mesopotamia was divided, the
others being Baghdad and
Mosul. Whenever Turkish
control was lax, local
power filled the vacuum. But always
the legitimate government
was that of the Sultan in
Istanbul, who was also to
be respected as titular head of
Islam.
Britain
didn't "liberate" Kuwait from anything. It merely elevated to the
position
of
"national" leader a petty sheikh who was little more benevolent than
the
Sultan.
Though posing as "protector", Britain was actually colonial overlord,
and
it is
from Britain that Kuwait finally gained independence in 1961. Britain doesn't
like
other societies to succeed, so it made a point of sowing distrust among its
colonies,
to prevent them from getting together against Britain, either to
demand
independence or to become commercial rivals after independence.
Whereas
the great Asiatic empires of which Iraq was part left behind major
states,
Britain left behind ministates scattered along the Persian Gulf and
Arabian
Sea coasts, as it did in the Caribbean and Oceania. Some of these
ministates
have tried to get together, with varying degrees of success, as for
instance
the United Arab Emirates. All that Iraq has done is to restore a natural
political
and economic order to its neighborhood by taking back its stolen
province.
What's the big deal?
------------------------------
http://www.palestinehistory.com/doc08.htm 11/17/2002
02-Nov-17
: The Balfour Declaration
Dear Lord Rithchild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to
you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and
approved by, the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government view with favour
the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and
will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievenment of this object,
it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or
the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would
bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Signed: Arthur James Balfour
1919 -
Palestinians first National Conference
The Palestinians convened their first
National Conference and expressed their opposition to the Balfour Declaration.
1920 -
San Remo Conference
The San Remo Conference granted Britain a
mandate over Palestine and two years later Palestine was effectively under
British administration, and Sir Herbert
Samuel, a declared Zionist, was sent as Britain's first High Commissioner to
Palestine.
1929 -
The riots
In August 1929, the century's first
large-scale attack on Jews by Arabs rocked Jerusalem. The riots, in which
Palestinians killed 133 Jews and suffered 116 deaths, mostly inflicted by
British troops, were sparked by a dispute over use of the Western Wall of
Al-Aqsa Mosque. . . . The British had
made promises to both Arabs and Zionists. The 1917 Balfour Declaration
supported the establishment of a "national home" for the Jews, while
pledging that nothing would be done to " prejudice the civil and religious
rights" of the Arabs. But the very presence of a Jewish homeland would,
Arabs insisted, infringe on those rights.
1936 - A
six months General Strike in Palestine
The Palestinians held a six months General
Strike to protest against the confiscation of land and Jewish immigration.
1937 -
The Peel Commission
Since the Balfour Declaration of 1917
(which endorsed the idea of a Jewish state within Palestine), the British
government had been struggling to
reconcile the conflicting aspirations of Jews and Arabs in Palestine, which
Britain administered under a League of
Nations mandate . Those who still believed in the possibility of peaceful coexistence
between the two groups got a grim
comeuppance in July 1937 when the Peel Commission, headed by Lord Robert Peel,
issued its report. Basically, the
commission concluded, the mandate in Palestine was unworkable. There was no
hope of any cooperative national entity
there that included both Arabs and Jews. The impetus for the commission's
formation had been the most recent
spark of Palestinian violence. Riots
and Arab protests against the Jews in Palestine had been escalating
throughout the 1920s and '30s. In the
mid-1930s, in response to the thousands of Jews who'd arrived from Europe,
Palestinian Arabs formed the Arab High
Committee to defend themselves against what they perceived as a Jewish
takeover. A general strike exploded into a revolt. Desperate for a
solution, the British appointed Lord Peel to study the situation. The Arab leadership boycotted the study.
After dismissing the possibility of
Arab-Jewish amity, the commission went on to recommend the partition of
Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab
state, and a neutral sacred-site state to be administered by Britain. Within
two years, Britain found itself in a
no-win situation, and on the eve of World War II issued the infamous
"White Paper" severely curtailing
Jewish immigration into Palestine.
-----------------------------------
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_ww1_british_mandate.php 11/17/2002
WHAT
WAS THE BRITISH MANDATE? [ISRAELI VERSION]
On
December 9, 1917, as World War I neared its end, Jerusalem surrendered to the
British forces. Two days
later
General Allenby entered the Jaffa Gate on foot, at the head of a victory
procession. This act marked the
end of
four centuries of Ottoman-Turk rule and the beginning of thirty years of
British rule.
The
mandate system was established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations as formulated at
the Paris
Peace Conference (January-June 1919). Under this article it was stated that the
territories inhabited
by
peoples unable to stand by themselves would be entrusted to advanced nations
until such time as the
local
population could handle their own affairs. This concept was incorporated into
the Treaty of Versailles on
June 28,
1919.
Representatives
of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Belgium met at San Remo,
Italy, in April
1920, to
discuss Methods of executing the Treaty of Versailles. Members of the supreme
council of the Allies
took
leading parts. The basic features of a peace treaty with Turkey (the Treaty of
Sèvres) were adopted,
and
mandates in the Middle East were allotted.
In the case
of Palestine, the administrative control, in the form of a Mandate, was given
to the British. By
naming
this territory the "British Mandate for Palestine" the area that is
today Israel and Jordan became the
first and
only geographic division with the name Palestine since before the Ottoman
Empire controlled the
area
(beginning in 1517). In July 1920 the Mandate civil administration took over
from the military. For the first
time
since Crusader days Jerusalem was again a capital city.
The terms
of the British Mandate incorporated the language of the Balfour Declaration and
were approved by
the
League of Nations Council on July 24, 1922, although they were technically not
official until September
29, 1923.
The United States was not a member of the League of Nations, but a joint
resolution of the United
States
Congress on June 30, 1922, endorsed the concept of the Jewish National Home.
Like the
Balfour Declaration, the Mandate recognized the "historical connection of
the Jewish people with
Palestine,"
called upon the mandatory power to "secure establishment of the Jewish
National Home," with "an
appropriate
Jewish agency" to be set up for advice and cooperation to that end. The
World Zionist
Organization,
which was specifically recognized as the appropriate vehicle, formally
established the Jewish
Agency in
1929. Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, while ensuring that the
"rights and position of other
sections
of the population are not prejudiced." English, Arabic, and Hebrew were
all to be official languages.
In March
1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary, convened a high-level
conference in Cairo
to
consider Middle East policy. As a result of these deliberations, Britain
subdivided the Palestine Mandate
along the
Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. The eastern portion--called Transjordan--was
to have a separate
Arab
administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for
Palestine, with Abdullah
appointed
as emir. At a follow-up meeting in Jerusalem with Churchill, High Commissioner
Herbert Samuel,
and
Lawrence, Abdullah agreed to abandon his Syrian project in return for the
emirate and a substantial
British
subsidy.
A British
government memorandum in September 1922 ("The Churchill White
Paper"), approved by the
League of
Nations Council, specifically excluded Jewish settlement from the Transjordan
area of the Palestine
Mandate.
The whole process was aimed at satisfying wartime pledges made to the Arabs and
at carrying out
British
responsibilities under the Mandate. Unfortunately for the Zionists and counter
to the whole expressed
purpose
of the Mandate in the first place, by this action more than three-quarters of
the territory of the British
Mandate
was taken away from the potential Jewish Homeland without any corresponding
action favoring the
Palistinian
Jews. The squeeky Arab wheel was greased with concessions at the sole expense
of the Jewish
population.