[selected readings for HIS 3995-02, Fall 2002, meeting of Wed., Nov. 20]
15 &
16 May, 1916:
The
Sykes-Picot Agreement [BRITISH-FRENCH
AGREEMENT FOR POSTWAR PARTITION OF OTTOMAN TURKISH-CONTROLLED ARAB TERRITORIES]
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1916/sykespicot.html 11/17/2002
1. Sir
Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15 May 1916
I shall
have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency's note of
the 9th instant, relative to
the
creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your
Excellency could assure me that in
those
regions which, under the conditions recorded in that communication, become
entirely French, or in
which
French interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British
concessions, rights of navigation
or
development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious,
scholastic, or medical institutions will be
maintained.
His
Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in
regard to the British area.
2. Sir
Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 16 May 1916
I have
the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th
instant, stating that the
French
Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of
States, and of those parts of
Syria
where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached
thereto, such as they
result
from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.
I have
the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole
project, as it now
stands,
will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His
Majesty's Government
recognise
the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more
favourable internal
political
situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at,
provided that the
co-operation
of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain
the towns of Homs,
Hama,
Damascus, and Aleppo.
It is
accordingly understood between the French and British Governments---
1. That
France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent
Arab State or a
Confederation
of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the
suzerainty of
an Arab
chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have
priority of right of enterprise
and local
loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone
supply advisers or foreign
functionaries
at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
2. That
in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to
establish such direct or
indirect
administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange
with the Arab State or
Confederation
of Arab States. 3. That in the brown area there shall be established an
international
administration,
the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and
subsequently in
consultation
with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.
4. That
Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a
given supply of water
from the
Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's Government, on
their part, undertake
that they
will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third
Power without the
previous
consent of the French Government.
5. That
Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire,
and that there shall be no
discrimination
in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods;
that there shall be
freedom
of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the
blue area, whether those
goods are
intended for or originate in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there
shall be no
discrimination,
direct or indirect against British goods on any railway or against British
goods or ships at any
port
serving the areas mentioned.
That
Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and
protectorates, and there
shall be
no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and
French goods. There
shall be
freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway
through the brown area,
whether
those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area
(B), and there shall be
no discrimination,
direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French
goods or ships at
any port
serving the areas mentioned.
6. That
in area (A) the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul,
and in area (B)
northwards
beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo via the
Euphrates Valley has
been
completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.
7. That
Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway
connecting Haifa with
area (B),
and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all
times.
It is to
be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the
connexion of Baghdad with
Haifa by
rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and
expense entailed by keeping
this
connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the
French Government shall be
prepared
to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis
Marib-Salkhab Tell
Otsda-Mesmie
before reaching area (B).
8. For a
period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in
force throughout the whole
of the
blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the
rates of duty or conversion
from ad
valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two
Powers.
There
shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas.
The customs duties
leviable
on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and
handed over to the
administration
of the area of destination.
9. It
shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any
negotiations for the cession of
their
rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power,
except the Arab State or
Confederation
of Arab States without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who,
on their
part,
will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red
area.
10. The
British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall
agree that they will not
themselves
acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions
in the Arabian
peninsula,
nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast,
or on the islands, of
the Red
Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as
may be necessary in
consequence
of recent Turkish aggression.
11. The
negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or
Confederation of Arab States
shall be
continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.
12. It is
agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab
territories will be considered by
the two
Governments.
I have
further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His
Majesty's Government
are
proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those
exchanged by the latter
and your
Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be
communicated to your
Excellency
as soon as exchanged.
I would
also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present
agreement raises, for
practical
consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition
or rearrangement of
Turkey in
Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915,
between Italy and the
Allies.
His
Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be
informed of the
arrangement
now concluded.
From: Country Study
& Country Guide for Syria
[http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/syria/syria15.html 11/17/2002]
WORLD WAR I AND
ARAB NATIONALISM [The case of SYRIA]
The period from
the outbreak of World War I in 1914 to the granting of France's mandate over
Syria by the
League of Nations in 1922 was marked by a complicated sequence of events and
power politics
during which Syrians achieved a brief moment of independence. Syrian
intellectuals,
many of them graduates of European and European- or American-run universities,
were urging the
study of Arab history, literature, and language. Also, groups of Syrians
publicly
demanded
decentralization of Ottoman administration and administrative reform. As
Ottoman
governors such as
Jamal Pasha suppressed them, Syrians went underground and demanded
complete Arab
independence. One of the first secret groups to form was Al Jamiyyah al
Arabiyah al Fatat
(the Young Arab Society, known as Al Fatat, not to be confused with the
contemporary Al
Fatah, or Fatah, of the Palestine Liberation Organization--PLO), of which
Prince Faysal, son
of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, was a member. Another group was Al Ahd (the
Covenant), a
secret association of Arab army officers.
Following the
outbreak of World War I, Jamal Pasha determined to tighten his control over
Syria. Attacking
dissidents ruthlessly, he arrested Al Fatat members. Twenty-one Arabs were
hanged in the city
squares of Damascus and Beirut on the morning of May 6, 1915. The event
is commemorated as
Martyrs' Day, a national holiday in Syria and Lebanon.
Events leading to
Syria's momentary independence began in the Arabian Peninsula. The
British--anxious
for Arab support against the Ottomans in the war and desiring to strengthen
their position
vis-a-vis the French in the determination of the Middle East's future--asked
Sharif Husayn, leader of the Hashimite
family and an Ottoman appointee over the Hijaz, to lead
the Arabs in
revolt. In return the British gave certain assurances, which Husayn interpreted
as
an endorsement of his eventual kingship of the Arab
world. From the Arab nationalists in
Damascus came
pleas for the Hashimites to assume leadership. Husayn accepted, and on June
5, 1916, the
Hijazi tribesmen, led by Husayn's sons and later advised by such British
officers as
T.E. Lawrence,
rose against the Turks. In October 1918, Faysal entered Damascus as a popular
hero.
Faysal, as military governor, assumed
immediate control of all Syria except for the areas along
the Mediterranean
coast where French troops were garrisoned. In July 1919, he convened the
General Syrian Congress, which declared Syria sovereign
and free. In March 1920, the congress
proclaimed Faysal
king of Syria.
Faysal and his
Syrian supporters began reconstructing Syria. They declared Arabic the official
language and
proceeded to have school texts translated from Turkish. They reopened schools
and started new
ones, including the Faculty of Law at the Syrian University and the Arab
Academy in
Damascus. Also, Faysal appointed a committee to begin drawing up a
constitution.
In the areas still
held by the French, Syrians continued to revolt. In the Jabal an Nusayriyah
around Latakia in
the northwest, there was an uprising against French troops in May 1919.
Along the Turkish
border, the nationalist leader Ibrahim Hannanu incited another rebellion in
July
1919. The French defeated these attempts but not
before Hannanu and Faysal had acquired
permanent places
in Syrian history as heroes.
Three forces
worked against Arab nationalism and Faysal's budding Arab monarchy. One was
Britain's earlier
interest in keeping eastern Mesopotamia under control, both to counter Russian
influence in the
north and to protect oil interests in the area. The second was Zionism and the
Jewish interest in
Palestine. Although Britain had promised to recognize "an independent Arab
State or a
Confederation of Arab States" in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16,
1916, (not
published until
later-see below), in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 it had also promised
Zionists
a "national
home" in Palestine. The two promises were in direct conflict. The third
force was
France's
determination to remain a power in the Middle East. Earlier in the war, the
French,
British, Italians,
and Russians had met secretly to decide the fate of Arab lands. After the
Russian
Revolution, the Bolsheviks published secret diplomatic documents, among them
the
Sykes-Picot
Agreement. In this agreement, signed only six months after the British had
vaguely
promised Husayn an
Arab kingdom, Britain and France agreed to give the French paramount
influence in what
became Syria and Lebanon; the British were to have predominance in what
became Transjordan
and Iraq.
At the Versailles
Peace Conference in 1919, Woodrow Wilson asked that the Arab claims to
independence be
given consideration, and Faysal was invited to present the Arab cause. His
pleas were
unavailing, as was a report recommending Syrian independence under Faysal or a
United States
mandate over the country. Disappointed by his failure at Versailles, Faysal
returned to
Damascus and declared again that Syria was nevertheless free and independent.
France and Britain
refused to recognize Syria's independence, and the Supreme Allied Council,
meeting in San
Remo, Italy, in April 1920, partitioned the Arab world into mandates as
prearranged by the
earlier Sykes-Picot Agreement. Syria became a French mandate, and
French soldiers
began marching from Beirut to Damascus. Arab resistance was crushed, and on
July 25, 1920, the
French took Damascus. Faysal fled to Europe and did not return to the
Middle East until the British made him king of Iraq in
1921. Faysal's brother Abdullah was
recognized by the
British as the amir of the region that became known as Transjordan. The
boundaries of
these states were thus drawn unilaterally by the European allies after World
War
I. Syria had
experienced its brief moment of independence (1919-20), the loss of which
Syrians
blamed on France
and Britain. These events left a lasting bitterness against the West and a
deep-seated
determination to reunite Arabs into one state. This was the primary basis for
modern Arab
nationalism and the central ideological concept of future pan-Arab parties,
such
as the Baath (Arab
Socialist Resurrection) Party and the Arab National Movement. Aspects of
the ideology also were
evolved in the 1950s and 1960s by Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt.
THE FRENCH
MANDATE IN SYRIA
French-British
rivalry in the Middle East continued after the two countries had divided the
area
into spheres of influence at San Remo. In
their mandate, the French sought to increase their
strength by
supporting and separating religious minorities and thereby weakening the
Ara b
nationalist movement. France originally planned to
establish three sectarian states: an Alawi
state in the
north, a Sunni Muslim state at the center, and a Druze state in the south. The
three were
eventually to be incorporated into a federal Syria. France did create a
Christian
state in the area
of Mount Lebanon. The Sunni Muslim state never materialized. Instead, in
1926 the French,
working with Maronite leaders, expanded the original boundaries of the
Christian state to
create Lebanon. To the east the valley of the Biqa, predominantly populated
by Muslims, was
added; to the west the Christian state was expanded to the coast and
incorporated the
cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre.
The rest of Syria
was divided into five semiautonomous areas- -the Jabal Druze, Aleppo,
Latakia, Damascus, and Alexandretta
(modern Iskenderun)--which accentuated religious
differences and
cultivated regional, as opposed to national pan-Arab, sentiment (see Religious
Life , ch. 2). The Druzes were given
administration of the Jabal Druze, the area of their
greatest
concentration. The northern coastal region and the Jabal an Nusayriyah (where
there
was a concentration
of Alawis, Syria's largest religious minority) were united in the state of
Latakia
(present-day Al Ladhiqiyah Province). North of Latakia, the district of
Alexandretta (the
present-day Turkish
province of Hatay), home of some Turks, had a separate government. In
the area to the
south, in Palestine, European Jews were promised a Jewish homeland.
Opposition by
nationalistic Arabs to the many divisions proved fruitless, and Arab
nationalists
became isolated in
Damascus.
French rule was
oppressive. The franc became the base of the economy, and currency
management was in
the hands of French bankers concerned with French, rather than Syrian,
shareholders and
interests. The French language became compulsory in schools, and pupils
were required to
sing the "Marseillaise." Colonial administrators attempted to apply
techniques
of administration
learned in North Africa to the more sophisticated Arabs of Syria. Nearly every
feature of Syrian
life came under French control.
The Syrians were
an embittered, disillusioned people whose leaders kept them in ferment.
Shaykh Salih ibn
Ali led the Alawis in intermittent revolt, Shaykh Ismail Harir rebelled in the
Hawran, and in the
Jabal Druze, Sultan Pasha al Atrash, kinsman of the paramount chief of the
Druzes, led
continual resistance, most notably in 1925, as did Mulhim Qasim in the
mountains
around Baalbek. The revolts, however, were
not necessarily expressions of desire for unified
Syrian
independence. They were uprisings by individual groups--Alawis, Druzes, and
beduins--against
foreign interference, comparable to those earlier fomented against the
Ottomans.
In Damascus Arab
nationalism was led by educated, wealthy Muslims who had earlier supported
Faysal. Their grievances against the French were
many, but chief among them were French
suppression of
newspapers, political activity, and civil rights and the division of Greater
Syria
into several political units. They also
objected to French reluctance to frame a constitution for
Syria that would
provide for the eventual sovereignty that the League of Nations mandate had
ordered. When the
Iraqis gained an elected assembly from the British in March 1924, Syrian
Arabs became even
more distressed. On February 9, 1925, as a placating move, the French
permitted the
nationalists to form the People's Party. Led by Faris al Khuri, they demanded
French recognition
of eventual Syrian independence, unity of the country, more stress on
education, and the
granting of civil liberties.
The most immediate
issue was Syrian unity, since France had divided the country into six
parts. In 1925 the
Aleppo and Damascus provinces were joined, and in 1926 Lebanon became
an independent republic under French control. The
League of Nations in its session in Rome in
February to March
1926 stated: "The Commission thinks it beyond doubt that these
oscillations
in matters so
calculated to encourage the controversies inspired by the rivalries of races,
clans
and religions,
which are so keen in this country, to arouse all kinds of ambitions and to
jeopardize serious
moral and material interests, have maintained a condition of instability and
unrest in the
mandated territory."
Devastating proof
of the miscalculations of the French burst into the open with the 1925 Druze
revolt. The Druzes
had many complaints, but chief among them was the foreign intervention in
Druze affairs. The
Ottomans had never successfully subdued these mountain people; although
split among
themselves, they were united in their opposition to foreign rule. Led by Sultan
Pasha al Atrash,
Druzes attacked and captured Salkhad on July 20, 1925, and on August 2 they
took the Druze capital, As Suwayda.
News of the Druze
rebellion spread throughout Syria and ignited revolts in Aleppo and
Damascus among
Syrian nationalists, who pleaded with Atrash to attack the Syrian capital. In
October the Druzes
invaded the Damascus region; nationalist leaders led their own
demonstrations;
and the French began systematic bombardment of the city, resulting in the
death of 5,000
Syrians. The rebellion collapsed by the end of the year, and reluctant order
replaced open
revolt.
The return of
order gave the French military government an opportunity to assist Syrians in
self-government,
an obligation demanded of France by the League of Nations. In 1928 the
French allowed the
formation of the National Bloc (Al Kutlah al Wataniyah), composed of
various
nationalist groups centered in Damascus. The nationalist alliance was headed by
Ibrahim Hannanu
and Hashim al Atassi and included leading members of large landowning
families. One of the most extreme groups in the
National Bloc was the Istiqlal (Independence)
Party, a
descendant of the old Al Fatat secret society of which Shukri al Quwatly was a
leading
member. Elections of that year for a
constituent assembly put the National Bloc in power, and
Hannanu set out to
write a constitution. It provided for the reunification of Syria and ignored
the authority of
the French. In 1930 the French imposed the constitution minus articles that
would have given
Syria unified self-government.
Syrian
nationalists continued to assert that they at least should have a treaty with
France
setting forth
French aims, since Britain and Iraq had signed such a treaty in 1922. Unrest
after
the death of the
nationalist leader Hannanu at the end of 1935, followed by a general strike in
1936, brought new
negotiations for such a treaty. Under Leon Blum's liberal-socialist
government in
France, the two countries worked out the Syrian-French Treaty of Alliance in
1936. The French
parliament never ratified the treaty, yet a feeling of optimism prevailed in
Syria as the first
nationalist government came to power with Hashim al Atassi as president.
During 1937 Syria's drive for independence seemed
to be advancing under National Bloc
leadership. France
allowed the return of Jabal Druze and Latakia to the Syrian state and turned
over many local
government functions to the Syrian government. French administration during
the previous years
had given some advantages to the Syrians. It had built modern cities in
Damascus and Aleppo
and roads and schools throughout much of the country; and it had
partially trained
some Syrians as minor bureaucrats. French cultural influence spread in the
schools, in the
press, and even in the style of dress; social and economic conditions slowly
improved.
Under the French,
Syria became a refuge for persecuted groups from neighboring countries.
Most of the Kurdish
population arrived between 1924 and 1938, fleeing Kemalist rule in Turkey.
The major
immigration of Armenians occurred between 1925 and 1945 as a result of similar
persecution.
Assyrians, under attack in Iraq in 1933, settled in eastern Syria (see Kurds;
Armenians; Others
, ch. 2).
Although the
country appeared to be on the verge of peace, true calm evaded Syria. Claims by
Turkey to Alexandretta, Arab revolts in Palestine, an
economic crisis caused by depreciation of
the French franc,
and lack of unity among Syrians served to undermine the stability of the
Syrian government.
The National Bloc was split by rivalries. Abdul Rahman Shahabandar, a
leading
nationalist, formed a rival organization in 1939 to compete for Syrian
political leadership,
but he was assassinated
a year later. Separatist movements in the Jabal Druze found French
support and
antagonized the nationalists.
During the course
of the Syrian-French treaty discussions in 1936, Turkey had asked for
reconsideration of
the situation in Hatay--at that time the Syrian province of
Alexandretta--which had a large Turkish minority and already had been
given a special
administrative system under the
Franco-Turkish Agreement of Ankara (sometimes called the
Franklin-Bouillon
Agreement) in 1921. The case was submitted to the League of Nations, which
in 1937 decided that
Alexandretta should be a separate, self- governing political state. Direct
negotiations
between Turkey and France ended on July 13, 1939, with France agreeing to
absorption of
Alexandretta by Turkey. Disturbances broke out in Syria against France and the
Syrian government,
which Syrian nationalist leaders felt had not adequately defended their
interests. Syrian
President Atassi resigned, parliamentary institutions were abolished, and
France governed an
unruly Syria through the Council of Directors. Latakia and the Jabal Druze
were again set up
as separate units. The French government officially declared it would not
submit the
Syrian-French treaty to the French Chamber of Deputies for ratification.
Data as of April
1987
----------------------------------
IRAQ [then referred to generally as
"Mesopotamia"]
http://www.cc.ukans.edu/~kansite/ww_one/docs/kncr.htm 11/17/2002
Report of
[the] American section of Inter-allied Commission of mandates in Turkey. An
official
United States
government report by the Inter-allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey.
American
Section [excerpt]
II-THE
REPORT UPON MESOPOTAMIA
In view
of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on January 30, 1919, and of
the Anglo-French
Declaration
of November 9, 1918-on the eve of the Armistice-both of which documents class
Syria and
Mesopotamia
together to be treated in the same way, and make to them the same promises and
assurances,
the
Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference, adopt for Mesopotamia a
policy in general
parallel
to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-French Declaration may
not become another
"scrap
of paper."
1. We
accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our
instructions, that
whatever
foreign administration is brought into Mesopotamia should come into Mesopotamia
not at ail as a
colonizing
power in the old sense of that term, but as a mandatary under the League of
Nations, with clear
consciousness
that "the well-being and development" of the Mesopotamian people form
for it a sacred trust.
To this
end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be
determined by the League of
Nations,
in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, whether in the
annual reports of the
Mandatary
to the League or in other ways.
The
entire text of the first recommendation for Syria, with its subordinate
recommendations, applies point by
point to
Mesopotamia as truly as to Syria.
If the Peace
Conference. the League of Nations, and the appointed Mandatary Power loyally
carry out the
policy of
mandataries embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the most
essential interests of
Mesopotamia
would be fully safeguarded-but only so.
2. We
recommend, in the second place that the unity of Mesopotamia be preserved: the
precise boundaries
to be
determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the mandate. has been
assigned. It should
probably
include at least the Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern
Kurds and Assyrians
might
well be linked up with Mesopotamia. The wisdom of a united country needs no
argument in the case of
Mesopotamia.
3. We
recommend, in the third place, that Mesopotamia be placed under one Mandatary
Power, as the
natural
way to secure real and efficient unity. The economic, political, social and
educational development of
the
people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste confusion, friction, and
injury to the people's
interests
could come from attempting a division and "spheres of influence" on
the part of several nations. But
this
implies that the Mandatary Power shall not itself be an exploiting power, but
shall sacredly guard the
people's
rights.
4. Since
it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony in the political and
economic institutions and
arrangements
of Mesopotamia and Syria, and since the people themselves should have chief
voice in
determining
the form of government under which they shall live we recommend that the
Government of
Mesopotamia,
in harmony with the apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional
Monarchy, such as is
proposed
for Syria; and that the people of Mesopotamia be given opportunity to indicate
their choice of
Monarch,
the choice to be reviewed and confirmed by the League of Nations. It may be
fairly assumed that
the 1,278
petitions from Syrians for the independence of Mesopotamia-68.5 per cent of the
total number
received-reflects
the feeling in Mesopotamia itself; and such contact as we have been able to
secure with
Mesopotamians
confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the program, presented at
Aleppo by
representative
Mesopotamians, headed by Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor of the Aleppo
District, and
practically
parallel to the Damascus Program, would be generally supported by the
Mesopotamian people.
Whether
this support extends to each item in the program alike, and so to the naming of
a King from the sons
of the
King of the Hedjaz, we have not sufficient data to determine, and so have
recommended that a
plebiscite
be taken upon that point; although there is British evidence that many
Mesopotamians have
expressed
themselves in favor of one of the sons of the King of the Hedjaz as Emir.
5. The
Mesopotamian Program expresses its choice of America as Mandatary, and with no
second choice.
Undoubtedly
there has been a good deal of feeling in Mesopotamia against Great Britain, and
the petitions
specifically
charge the British authorities in Mesopotamia with considerable interference
with freedom of
opinion,
of expression, and of travel,-much of which might be justified in time of
military occupation. But
feeling
so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express desire for Great
Britain as Mandatary.
On the other
hand, the material in the pamphlet called "Copies and Translations of
Declarations and other
Documents
relating to Self-Determination in Iraq" (Mesopotamia) was called out by an
attempt on the part of
the
British Government in Mesopotamia to secure the opinions of leading men of all
groups concerning
"self-determination."
This material just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtless
somewhat
more
favorable to the British than it would otherwise be; but it gives
unquestionably good evidence of much
opinion
likely to choose a British mandate. And after all the range of choice of a
mandatary, of sufficient
power and
experience and of essential justice, is decidedly limited, and it is by no
means improbable that if
the
Mesopotamians were confronted by a refusal of America to take a mandate for
Mesopotamia, they would
make
Great Britain at least second choice, as the majority of the Syrians did. There
is supplementary
evidence
also upon this point.
Now it
seems so unlikely that America could or would take a mandate for Mesopotamia,
in addition to the
possible
consideration of Syria and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that
the Peace
Conference
assign the mandate for Mesopotamia to Great Britain: because of the general
reasons already
given for
recommending her as mandatary in Syria if America does not go in there, because
she is probably
best of
all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long relations with
the Arabs; in recognition of
the sacrifices
made by her in delivering Mesopotamia from the Turks, though with no
acknowledgment of right
of
conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because of the special
interests she naturally has in
Mesopotamia
on account of its nearness to India and its close connections with Arabia; and
because of work
already
done in the territory.
These
reasons make it probable that the largest interests of the people of
Mesopotamia as a whole will be
best
served by a British Mandate, in spite of the fact that from the point of view
of world-interests, in the
prevention
of jealousy, suspicion, and fear of domination by a single Power, it were
better for both Britain and
the world
that no further territory anywhere be added to the British Empire. A British
mandate however, will
have the
decided advantage of tending to promote economic and educational unity
throughout Mesopotamia
and Syria
whether Syria be under Great Britain or America-and so will reflect more fully
than ever before, the
close
relations in language, customs, and trade between these parts of the former
Turkish Empire.
In a
country so rich as Mesopotamia in agricultural possibilities, in oil, and in
other resources, with the best
intentions
there will inevitably be danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the
Mandatary Power,
through
making British interests supreme, and especially through large Indian
immigration. This danger will
need
increasingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Mesopotamians feel
very strongly the
menace particularly of Indian immigration, even though that immigration should