THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(excerpts
from the G.D.H. Cole transl. of the original French
edition of 1763]
MAN
is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself
the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this
change come about? I do not know. What
can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.
If
I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should say:
"As long as a people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does well; as
soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does still better;
for, regaining its liberty by the same right as took it away, either it is
justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it
away." But the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other
rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be
founded on conventions. . . .
.
. .
.
. . Aristotle . . . had said that men are by no means equal naturally, but that
some are born for slavery, and others for dominion.
Aristotle
was right; but he took the effect for the cause. Nothing can be more certain
than that every man born in slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose everything
in their chains, even the desire of escaping from them: they love their
servitude . . . If then there are slaves by nature, it is because there have
been slaves against nature. Force made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated
the condition.
.
. .
To
renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of
humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is
possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature; to remove all
liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts. Finally, it is
an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute
authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can
be under no obligation to a person from whom we have the right to exact
everything? Does not this condition alone, in the absence of equivalence or
exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what right can my slave
have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine,
this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?
.
. .
So,
from whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null and
void, not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and
meaningless. The words slave and right contradict each other, and are mutually
exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a man or to a
people: "I make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to
my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will keep it as long
as I like."
.
. .
.
. . [A]s men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing
ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by
aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance [of any
individual]. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive
power, and cause to act in concert.
This
sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the
force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his
self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests,
and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on
my present subject, may be stated in the following terms:
"The
problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the
whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as
free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social
Contract provides the solution.
.
. .
These
clauses [of the social contract], properly understood, may be reduced to one —
the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the
whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the
conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in
making them burdensome to others.
.
. .
If
then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall
find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each of us puts his person and all his
power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our
corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the
whole."
.
. .
In
order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly
includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever
refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.
This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the
condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all
personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political
machine; this alone legitimises civil undertakings,
which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most
frightful abuses.
.
. .
However,
none but the greatest dangers can counterbalance that of changing the public
order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the
existence of the country is at stake. In these rare and obvious cases,
provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to
him who is most worthy. This commitment may be carried out in either of two
ways, according to the nature of the danger.
If
increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is
concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the change
is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of administering
them. If, on the other hand, the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia
of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a
supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the
sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will,
and it is clear that the people's first intention is that the State shall not
perish. . . .